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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
(3) Were dividends distributed which were less than the
current earnings or in excess of current earnings?
As shown by the previous analysis, only where the advances
are equity advances which are disproportionate to the common
stock interest with dividends paid which are in excess of current
earnings does a second class of stock exist within the congres-
sional intention of section 1371 (a) (4).
It was previously stated that the court reached the correct
result in Stinnett. To verify that statement the above tests are
applied to the facts of that case. The court clearly stated that it
construed the advances to be equity advances, and petitioner
admitted that the advances were disproportionate. However,
since the notes were non-interest bearing, no "preferred divi-
dends" were paid. Therefore, no dividends were distributed in
excess of current earnings, and the stock did not constitute a
second class of stock.
Since regulation § 1.1371 (g) was declared invalid as applied
to the facts of Stinnett, hopefully the commissioner will ac-
quiesce to that position and amend the regulations to provide
the three step test to determine whether advances constitute a
second class of stock. Such a test would make the regulation
in agreement with the congressional intent prohibiting a second
class of stock and would put at rest a controversy which remains
unsettled after twelve years of existence.
J. Edgerton Pierson, Jr.
COMPULSORY AGREEMENT TO SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS:
A REMEDY NOT ALLOWED
The National Labor Relations Board found the company's
refusal to bargain about a checkoff clause was not made in
good faith and was done solely to frustrate the making of any
collective bargaining agreement. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia approved this finding.1 That court also
enforced the Board's order to the company to cease and desist
from refusing to bargain in good faith and to further bargain
over the checkoff if the union so requested. The court implied
that the Board could require the company to agree to a checkoff
1. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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provision as a remedy.2 On a motion to clarify its opinion, the
court held that in certain circumstances a "checkoff may be
imposed as a remedy for bad faith bargaining."8 On remand,
the Board issued an order including such a remedy which was
then affirmed by the court of appeals.4 The United States
Supreme Court reversed and held, while the Board has power
to require employers and employees to negotiate, it is without
power to compel a company or a union to agree to any sub-
stantive contractual provision of a collective bargaining agree-
ment. H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
The National Labor Relations Act sets forth the national
policy of encouraging the practice of collective bargaining.5 To
insure compliance with this policy, Congress made it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees.6 In 1947 Congress
amended the Act stating in § 8(d):
"[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment, . . . but such obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession ... '"
2. Id. at 276 n. 16: "To suggest that in further bargaining the company
may refuse a check-off for some other reason, not heretofore advanced,
makes a mockery of the collective bargaining required by statute."
3. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 295, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
4. H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964). Congress also made it an unfair labor
practice for the representatives of the workers not to bargain, but such a
problem seldom arises.
7. Id. § 158(d). This section of the NLRA was added by Congress In
1947. From the inception of the NLRA In 1935 until 1947 there had been
great concern in Congress and by the Supreme Court that the government
might compel agreement between employers and employees. S. REP. No. 573,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935); 79 CONG. REc. 7659 (1935); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937). In 1947 the congressional concern
over this issue had not subsided and in H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 19-20 (1947) the committee said: "[T]he present Board has gone very
far, in the guise of determining whether or not employers had bargained in
good faith, in setting itself up as the judge of what concessions an employer
must make and of the proposals and counterproposals that he may or may
not make .... [U]nless Congress writes into the law guides for the Board
to follow, the Board may attempt to carry this process still further and
seek to control more and more the terms of collective-bargaining agree-
ments."
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In NLRB v. American National Insurance Co.,8 the Supreme
Court considered the effect of § 8 (d). It found clearly ".... that
the Board may not, either directly or indirectly, compel con-
cessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive
terms of collective bargaining agreements."9 It seems certain
from the language of § 8(d) that the Board cannot compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require a concession.
However, the Court's broad language that the Board may not
"sit in judgment upon the substantive terms" has been tempered
by subsequent circuit court decisions.
The Fifth Circuit, in NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co.,10
stressed the need for consideration of the substantive terms of
an agreement when it said:
"[B]ad faith is prohibited though done with sophistication
and finesse. Consequently, to sit at a bargaining table, or
to sit almost forever, or to make concessions here and there,
could be the very means by which to conceal a purposeful
strategy to make bargaining futile or fail.""
Many other cases indicate that "surface bargaining" will
not be tolerated 12 and the lack of concession on a substantive
term is evidence of this kind of bargaining. Even the Court in
American National Insurance made it clear that the "no-
concession" clause of § 8(d) was not to be interpreted so as
to make the "good faith" clause meaningless. 18 In NLRB v.
Reed & Prince Manufacturing Co., Judge Magruder emphasized
that, though the Board may not compel agreement on a partic-
ular provision, the lack of concession is some evidence of bad
faith. 14 To determine whether bad faith exists, the Board must
8. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
9. Id. at 404.
10. 275 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1960).
11. Id. at 232.
12. See, e.g., NLRB v. Athens Mfg. Co., 161 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1947); Stone-
wall Cotton Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.2d 629, 631 (5th Cir. 1942); NLRB v.
Whittier Mills Co., 111 F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 1940).
13. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952): "And, as
has long been recognized, performance of the duty to bargain requires more
than a willingness to enter upon a sterile discussion of union-management
differences."
14. 205 F.2d 131, 134-35 (1st Cir. 1953): "In other words, while the Board
cannot force an employer to make a 'concession' on any specific issue or
to adopt any particular position, the employer is obliged to make some
reasonable effort in some direction to compose his differences with the union,
if § 8(a) (5) is to be read as imposing any substantial obligation at all."
[Vol. 31
NOTES
look to the totality of the circumstances; 5 the lack of concession
by the employer is but one factor. 6 A standard of "reasonable-
ness" is then applied to distinguish between a bad faith refusal
to bargain and a hard bargaining stand made in good faith.17
Once it has been decided that there was a refusal to bar-
gain, the Board must fashion a remedy. Section 10(c) of the
Act gives the Board wide discretion in fashioning remedies by
allowing it to issue cease and desist orders and to take other
"affirmative action."' 8 The Supreme Court has stated that the
Board alone"9 has the power to determine the particular means
by which the effects of an unfair labor practice are to be
expunged.20 However, the Board's orders will be disturbed by
the court whenever there is a patent attempt to achieve ends
other than those effectuating the policies of the NLRA.21 Occa-
sionally, at the same time that the Board's remedy is fulfilling
one policy it is undermining an equally important policy. 22
Therefore, the Board must carefully examine the potential
ramifications of an order before it is issued.
In H. K. Porter the court of appeals in judging the com-
pany's stand on the checkoff clause, a substantive term of the
15. For a more complete discussion, see Maxwell, The Duty to Bargain
in Good Faith, Boulwarism, and a Proposal--The Ascendance of the Rule
of Reasonableness, 71 DicK. L. REV. 531 (1967).
16. NLRE v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir. 1953);
NLRB v. General Electric Co., 418 F.2d 736, 757 (2d Cir. 1969).
17. NLRB v. General Electric Co., 418 F.2d 736, 757 (2d Cir. 1969): "While
GE may have believed that it was acting within its 'rights' in offering a
take-it-or-leave-it proposal, doing so may still be some evidence of lack of
good faith. Here there was no substantial justification offered for refusing
to discuss the matter .... " When a court says that there is "no substantial
Justification," it is obviously judging the reasonableness of the employer's
stand.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)(1964): "If . . . the Board shall be of the opinion
that any person . . . has engaged in or is engaging in any ... unfair labor
practice, then the Board shall . . .cause to be served on such person an
order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor prac-
tice, and to take such affirmative action . . .as will effectuate the policies
of this subchapter [the Act] .... "
19. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941): "[T]he relation
of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence
20. May Dep't Stores v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376 (1945); NLRB v. Link-Belt
Co., 311 U.S. 584, 600 (1941); NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303
U.S. 261, 271 (1938).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)(1964); Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379
U.S. 203, 216 (1964); Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533,
540 (1943); Local 57, ILGW v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
22. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348 (1953). For ex-
amples of the Board's difficulties in coordinating the various policies of the
Act, see Note, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 78 (1963).
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negotiation, found it to be unreasonable 8 and a violation of
§ 8 (a) (5) of the Act. This action was consistent with recent
jurisprudence in this area.24 The Supreme Court agreed with
the lower court's action, thereby overruling its earlier dictum
in American National Insurance that substantive terms were
beyond the Board's examination.2 5 However, the Supreme Court
disagreed with the lower court's holding that in certain cir-
cumstances a "checkoff may be imposed as a remedy for bad
faith bargaining .... '26 This was the first time in the history
of the National Labor Relations Act that the Board had ordered
a party to agree to a substantive term of an agreement as a
remedy for a refusal to bargain in good faith.
The court of appeals obviously reasoned that the Board,
in utilizing fully its wide discretion to fashion remedies was
justified in ordering this remedy;27 section 8 (d) in spite of its
''no-concession" clause, did not limit the Board's remedial power.
It was their opinion that § 8(d) related to a determination of
whether a refusal to bargain violation had occurred and not to
the scope of the remedy which would be appropriate for the
violation.28 The Supreme Court agreed that this may be true
as a matter of literal interpretation, but the Court added that
this interpretation did not justify the "conclusion that the
remedial powers of the Board are not also limited by the same
considerations that led Congress to enact § 8(d)."29
The Supreme Court reasoned that it would be inconsistent
to hold that § 8 (d) prohibited the Board from relying on a
"refusal to agree" as the sole indicator of bad faith and, at the
same time, to allow the Board to compel agreement in the same
dispute. While the Court admitted that the Board's remedial
powers are broad, it emphasized that these powers are limited
23. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The court
of appeals found that the company's objection to a checkoff was not due to
any policy against making deductions from the employees' pay. The com-
pany had already made deductions for taxes, insurance, and other Items.
H. K. Porter's objection was not based on inconvenience, but only on an un-
willingness to help the union. By judging the stand taken by H. K. Porter
as having no legitimate business reason, the court was applying the test of
"reasonableness."
24. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
25. H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 90 S. Ct. 821, 825 (1970): "[T]he Court of
Appeals approved the further finding that the employer had not bargained
In good faith, and the validity of that finding is not now before us."
26. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 295, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 90 S. Ct. 821, 825 (1970). See note 7 supra.
[Vol. 31
NOTES
to effectuating the policies of the Act. The remedy of compul-
sory agreement to a term violated the policy of freedom of
contract. Although freedom of contract is not absolute under
the Act a fundamental premise is that there should be "private
bargaining under governmental supervision of the procedure
alone."3 0
The decision in H. K. Porter seems clearly correct. The
Board should fashion remedies directed toward allowing the
parties to come to the table to bargain with each other. If the
remedy itself sets the terms of an agreement, there is no
possibility of bargaining. Thus, the remedy of compulsory agree-
ment exceeds the limitation of effectuating the policies of the
Act.
Unfortunately, the H. K. Porter opinion included unneeded
dictum. In the process of pointing out possible reasons for the
court of appeals' decision, the Supreme Court stated that the
Act did not forbid "an employer or a union to rely ultimately
on its economic strength to secure what it cannot obtain through
bargaining."8 1 This general statement was erroneous in the
context of the present case where an unfair labor practice
had been committed by the employer. Although Congress has
left intact the right to use the economic weapons of strike and
lockout when an impasse is reached during good faith bar-
gaining,3 2 in the instant case the employer's bad faith posture
presented a different situation. A union strike would not have
been considered an economic strike, but an unfair labor practice
strike.3 3 Nor could the company have used a lockout since there
30. H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 90 S. Ct. 821, 826 (1970).
31. Id.
32. Publishers' Ass'n v. NLRB, 364 F.2d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966).
"[Congress] has recognized and enforced the employees' right to self
organization and collective bargaining, but left intact the right to use
the economic weapons of strike and lockout when good faith bargaining
fails ......
33. See NLRB v. Southland Cork Co., 342 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1965) where
a strike called because of employer's failure to bargain in good faith was
deemed an unfair labor practice strike. The result of being an unfair labor
practice strike instead of an economic strike is a favorable position for the
union members. The strikers are entitled to immediate reinstatement upon
request even if it means the employer must discharge replacement workers.
NLRB v. Pecheur Lozenge Co., 209 F.2d 393, 404-05 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. de-
nied, 347 U.S. 953 (1954).
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was a finding of unlawful intent on its part to evade the duty
to bargain collectively."
Probably, no chance of confusion would have resulted from
the improper dictum discussed above had the Supreme Court
been careful to apply the H. K. Porter decision to the issue of
the propriety of the remedy ordered by the Board. However,
the Supreme Court applied H. K. Porter to Tex Tan Welhausen
Co. v. NLRB,85 a case presenting not only the issue of the pro-
priety of the remedy ordered by the Board, but also the issue of
bad faith bargaining. The Supreme Court remanded Tex Tan to
the Fifth Circuit for "further consideration in light of H. K.
Porter," even though the Fifth Circuit had concluded:
"The Board's order does no more than require the Company
to bargain in good faith .... Contrary to Tex Tan's asser-
tions the order only requires that any agreement reached be
incorporated into the contract. The Board did not attempt to
dictate what the agreement might be."386
If the Supreme Court disagreed with this conclusion and believed
the Board's remedy improper, it should have been more explicit
since the issue of bad faith was also before the Court in Tex Tan.
On the other hand, if the Court was unhappy about the finding
of bad faith by the Board, it should not have cited to the lower
court a case which did not deal with the issue of bad faith.
However, the Fifth Circuit in considering Tex Tan on remand
properly refused to discuss the issue of bad faith, and, instead,
changed its original holding concerning the propriety of the
remedy ordered by the Board.8
The instant case is important because it limits the Board's
remedial powers. Unless this power is limited, the government is
free to impose its will on labor and management by dictating
34. See American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 308 (1965):
"It is important to note that there is here no allegation that the employer
used the lockout in the service of designs inimical to the process of collective
bargaining." An inference can be drawn that a lockout would not be allowed
if there exists a refusal to bargain in good faith. NLRB v. Golden State
Bottling Co., 401 F.2d 454, 456-57 (9th Cir. 1965): "[A] lockout ... does not
violate Section 8(a)(3) and (1) unless there exists a supportable finding of
unlawful intent on the part of the employer to injure a labor organization
or to evade his duty to bargain collectively . . . ." See also NLRB v. Dalton
Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886, 894 (5th Cir. 1962).
35. 90 S. Ct. 1516 (1970).
36. Tex Tan Welhausen Co. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1265, 1270-71 (5th Cir.
1969).
37. Tex Tan Welhausen Co. v. NLRB, 434 F.2d 405, 407 (5th Cir. 1970).
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the terms of an agreement. Although only good intentions may
motivate the Board, governmental determination of substantive
terms would destroy the collective bargaining process since there
would be no "bargaining" between the private parties. The col-
lective bargaining process is valuable in maintaining peaceful
labor relations. Congress evidently agreed when it made the en-
couragement of collective bargaining a major policy of the NLRA.
The broad remedial power given to the Board to effectuate this
policy should not be used to destroy it. Therefore, the Board's
remedial power must necessarily be limited so as to encourage
bargaining between labor and management.88
Edward A. Griffis
MINERAL LEASES-LESSEE DRAINING OTHER OF His LEASED
PREMISES CONSIDERED AS AN AcTIVE BREACH
Plaintiff-lessors sued their lessee in federal district court'
seeking an accounting for drainage of oil and gas from beneath
their premises caused by lessee's operations on adjoining prem-
ises. In the alternative plaintiffs prayed for damages for drain-
age because of lessee's breach of the implied obligation to pro-
tect the leased premises from drainage. Defendant-lessee moved
for summary judgment, claiming inter alia that plaintiffs' failure
to place lessee in default barred their action for damages. The
motion was denied as to the necessity of a putting in default.
Both parties appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed, hold-
ing that the failure of lessors to give notice in this case and
under these circumstances would not bar their action for damages
because Louisiana courts2 would characterize lessee's failure to
prevent drainage as an active breach of the lease contract. Wil-
liams v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 432 F.2d 165 (5th Cir.
1970), rehearing denied, 435 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1970).
The question of recovery of damages for drainage was put
38. H. K. Porter v. NLRB, 90 S. Ct. 821, 826 (1970): "It may well be true,
as the Court of Appeals felt, that the present remedial powers of the Board
are insufficiently broad to cope with important labor problems. But it is
the job of Congress, not the Board nor the courts to decide when and if it Is
necessary to allow governmental review of proposals for collective bargain-
ing agreements and compulsory submission to one side's demands."
1. Federal jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship under 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
2. Since there was no federal law governing the case the federal courts
were bound to apply the law of the forum state under the doctrine of Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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